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In this paper we exhibit several new classes of hash functions with certain desirable 
properties, and introduce two novel applications for hashing which make use of these 
functions. One class contains a small number of functions, yet is almost universal,. If the 
functions hash n-bit long names into m-bit indices, then specifying a member of the class 
requires only O((m + log, log,(n)) . log,(n)) bits as compared to O(n) bits for earlier 
techniques. For long names, this is about a factor of m larger than the lower bound of 
m + log, n -log, m bits. An application of this class is a provably secure authentication 
technique for sending messages over insecure lines. A second class of functions satisfies a 
much stronger property than universal,. We present the application of testing sets for 
equality. 
The authentication technique allows the receiver to be certain that a message is genuine. An 
“enemy”-even one with infinite computer resources-cannot forge or modify a message 
without detection. The set equality technique allows operations including “add member to 
set,” “delete member from set” and “test two sets for equality” to be performed in expected 
constant time and with less than a specified probability of error. 
Hash functions are functions which map from larger domains to smaller ranges, 
They may be viewed as a means of assigning an abbreviation to a name. A desirable 
property of a hash function is that “most of the time,” when the hashed values of two 
quantities are the same, the quantities are the same. While one must be careful of 
what one means by “most of the time,” this intuition has led to the two applications 
described in this paper. For instance, the set equality tester works by maintaining an 
abbreviation for each set (namely, its hashed value). It will declare two sets to be 
equal if the abbreviations are the same. Thus, it is correct most of the time when it 
says the sets are equal, and always right when it says they are unequal. While this 
idea is not new [ 131, we here use the techniques of universal hashing so that the 
probability of making an error is small for any pair of sets, not just for randomly 
chosen sets. We first will briefly summarize universal hashing to make this distinction 
clearer. 
Hashing can be used to achieve fast average performance for a variety of 
applications, most notably for an associative memory such as a compiler’s symbol 
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table or a database. One would like “average performance” to mean the performance 
averaged over all inputs that the application will be run on. However, one usually 
doesn’t know the actual data, and so one chooses a hash function which will work 
well assuming each input is equally likely. Recently an approach to hashing has been 
developed which allows one to achieve and prove a fast average performance, without 
needing to assume anything about the probability distribution on the inputs [6]. In 
this approach, one has a collection of hash functions, instead of just one. Each time 
the application is run, a hash function is randomly selected from the set. (If this is 
impractical, functions may be chosen less frequently, or perhaps only once. See [6] 
for a more complete discussion.) If the set of functions is carefully chosen to be what 
is called a universal, class, then many applications of hashing will have provably 
good expected performance for any distribution of inputs, not just the uniform 
distribution. 
Known universal classes contain a fairly large number of hash functions. For 
instance, the functions in a typical class can hash n-bit long names, and the class 
contains 2’(“) functions. Thus, O(n) bits are required to specify a randomly chosen 
function. In Section 3, we present a set of functions which is “almost” strongly 
universal, and is much smaller--only log(n) bits are required. This improvement can 
make some afiplications of hashing practical, for instance the authentication 
technique described below. Also, if used in conjunction with the extendible hashing 
scheme of [9], one can make a fast, practical and completely general associative 
memory subroutine package. 
A possibly important use of these functions, described in Section 2, is a provably 
secure authentication system. This system allows the receiver of a message to be sure 
of the authenticity of a message-that the message was not forged or modified by an 
unauthorized “enemy.” It is necessary for the sender and the receiver to share a secret 
key whose length is on the order of the log of the length of the message, But unlike 
digital signatures based on public key cryptosystems, it can be proven that this 
system is secure even against an enemy with infinite computing power. Also, there 
are no messages which just happen to be easy to forge. 
Section 4 gives a refinement of the authentication system which allows many 
messages to be sent using the same secret key, with each message requiring an 
additional but shorter key. The total length of the keys required for sending multiple 
messages asymptotically achieves the lower bound. 
The application which motivated defining strongly universal, classes of 
functions-a set equality tester- is given in Section 5. Assuming that sets are 
constructed using certain specified operations, we give a technique which has an input 
independent and small chance of error for determining that sets are equal. The 
expected running time of the algorithm is input independent and is linear in the 
number of construction operations and equality tests. This is the only algorithm we 
have seen with the dubious distinction of requiring probabilistic analyses of two 
kinds-it can both make a mistake and take a long time doing so. As Gill has 
observed [ 111, one can always make the running time constant at the expense of a 
larger probability of error. Alternatively, one can use the technique in conjunction 
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with an ordinary set equality testing method. If the probabilistic test says the sets are 
different, it must be correct. If it says the sets are the same, one could then perform 
the conventional test. 
Finally, in Section 6, we show how to construct a strongly universal, set of 
functions. The functions in this set can be evaluated rapidly. 
1. STRONGLY UNIVERSAL SETS OF HASH FUNCTIONS 
To be universal,, a set of functions from A to B must only satisfy a requirement on 
the probability that a randomly chosen function will map two points of A to the same 
value. For a set of functions to be strongly universal,, a randomly chosen function 
must, with equal probability, map any II distinct points of A to any n values in B; in 
other words, any n points must be distributed randomly throughout B by the 
functions. More formally, 
DEFINITION. Suppose H is a set of hash functions, each element of H being a 
function from A to B. H is strongly universal, if given any n distinct elements 
a, ,..., a, of A and any n (not necessarily distinct) elements b ,,..., b, of B, then 
] Hl/(lBl”) functions take a, to b,, a, to b,, etc. (IX] means the number of elements in 
the set X.) A set of hash functions is strongly universal, if it is strongly universal, for 
all values of n.’ 
Carter and Wegman [6] present several classes of hash functions which turn out to 
be strongly universal,. Strongly universal,, sets of functions can be created using 
polynomials over finite fields. In particular, let A and B both be the same finite field. 
Let H be the class of polynomials of degree less than n. H is strongly universal, since 
given any n distinct elements of A and corresponding elements of B, there is exactly 
one polynomial of degree less than n which “interpolates” through the designated 
pairs. (The standard linear algebra proof which uses the invertibility of the Vander- 
monde matrix also works with finite fields.) 
It may seem peculiar to define a set of hash functions with A and B being the same 
size. However, it is easy to make B smaller by, for instance, just choosing the last 
bits of the hashed value. If the size of the field is a power of two, the result will still 
be a strongly universal,, class of functions; otherwise, it will still be “close.” 
In Section 6, we will exhibit a strongly universal, set of functions. 
2. DIGITAL SIGNATURES AND AUTHENTICATION TAGS 
It is often desirable to be able to send a message over an insecure line and yet 
allow the receiver to be certain of the identity of the sender. (For convenience, we will 
use “A” or “he” to denote the purported sender of a message, and “B” or “she” for 
the receiver.) Before modern communication methods existed, A could add a 
handwritten signature to a message. B could compare the signature on a message to 
’ The only strongly universal, set of functions from A to B is the set of all functions from A to B; 
however, we feel it gives useful intuition to think of this class as defined here. 
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what she knew was A’s signature to assure herself the message was genuine. Someone 
who intercepted the message could not cut off the signature and paste it to a different 
document without detection. We seek to gain these advantages in the case of digital 
messages. 
A signature serves a number of functions: 
(1) It can assure B that the message was sent by A or someone authorized by 
him. 
(2) It can be used to prove (perhaps in a court) that A or someone authorized by 
him sent the message, and 
(3) It can assure B that A himself, not just someone authorized by A, actually 
sent the message. 
Authentication tags provide a method of accomplishing the first of these three 
functions. If there is an agency which everyone trusts, then authentication tags can 
also be used to provide the second function. Before presenting these authentication 
tags, we would like to review two other methods which also have some of the 
properties of signatures-digital signatures and encryption. None of the methods we 
will discuss can be used for the third function since the methods do not depend on 
physical properties of A but only on some knowledge which he could reveal to 
someone else. 
A digital signature as discussed by Diffte and Hellman [7] consists of a string of 
bits which is concatenated to a message. Only A knows the function which is used to 
generate the signature, but he also publishes a checking function. This checking 
function allows anyone to test whether the signature is valid for the particular 
message. Moreover, without the signing function (but even with the checking 
function) it is difftcult to determine the correct signature to any alternate message. 
For all messages there exists a valid signature. 
Diffie and Hellman [ 71, and Rivest et al. [ 121 have presented “public key cryp- 
tosystems” which allow the above (in addition to allowing an interesting type of 
encryption.) However, 
THEOREM. No public key cryptosystem is unbreakable. That is, an enemy with 
unbounded computing resources can forge messages. 
Proof: An enemy with enough time can guess all possible signatures for a 
particular message and when a valid signature is found use it. 
Thus, all such signature schemes can be cracked in nondeterministic polynomial 
time, and none have so far been shown to be NP-complete. In fact, [ 1,2] have shown 
that unless NP = co-NP (which many people believe is unlikely) no public key cryp- 
tosystem can be NP-complete. 
A traditional encryption scheme also provides some of the function of a signature. 
Suppose A and B have agreed upon an encryption and a decryption method, which 
they keep secret. When B receives any string of bits, she applies the decryption 
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algorithm. If the result looks sensible, she has some assurance that the string of bits 
was indeed a message sent by A. This approach has several disadvantages. Firstly, it 
could happen that if a certain portion of any encrypted valid message is twiddled in a 
certain way, then the result still has a reasonable chance of being an encrypted valid 
(but different) message. If so, an enemy could interfere with the communication, even 
without being able to decrypt any message. This is a technique for creating malicious 
mischief. 
If the enemy knows the message being sent, things are even worse. For example, 
suppose the messages between a bank teller and the central office is encrypted by an 
exclusive-or with a random and never reused bit string. (This is known to be a 
probably unbreakable encryption technique.) A thief makes a deposit and the teller 
sends a record of the transaction to the central office. The thief now intercepts the 
encoded message and prevents it from being sent to the central office. Since the thief 
knows both the plaintext and encrypted version of the message, he can exclusive-or 
them together to recover the one-time random bit string. He can now substitute a 
different message-perhaps a record of a larger deposit-exclusive-ored with the 
now-known bit string. The moral is that a good encryption technique may be of no 
help in proving authorship. One can only trust the authenticity of messages to the 
extent that one can prove that such systematic changes are impossible. 
A second disadvantage of using encryption for determining authorship is that there 
must be some redundancy in the communication. If most strings of bits were valid 
messages and if the encryption process didn’t increase the length of a message, then B 
would accept most transmissions as valid. Thus, one must be careful about applying 
any data compression to the messages. With authentication tags, one can separate the 
secrecy aspects of communication from the authentication aspects. One can use the 
tags with or without encrypting the message, and the only redundancy needed is the 
extra bits needed for the tag itself. 
Unlike digital signatures and encryption, a carefully constructed authentication tag 
system has the property that it is provably impossible for a forger to have more than 
an arbitrarily small chance of creating a message which the receiver will accept as 
genuine. 
An authentication tag system can be formalized as follows: There is a set M of 
possible messages and a set T of authentication tags. For instance, M might be the set 
of all character strings of length 10,000 or less, and T might be the set of bit strings 
of length 100. There is also a (publicly known) set of functions F, where each 
function in F maps M into T. To use the system, A and B agree upon a secret “key” 
which specifies one of the functions f in F. When A transmits a message m in M, he 
also sends the authentication tag f(m). B checks that f applied to the message she 
received is indeed the tag she received. If so, she has some assurance the received 
message is not a forgery. It must be impossible to find the function from a message 
and its tag. Otherwise the forgers might intercept, analyze and replace the message 
with one of their own. In fact, knowing the value off on one message must give no 
information about the value off on any other message. We will show a little later 
how this can be accomplished. 
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It is natural to wonder, if A and B have agreed upon any secret authentication 
function that nobody has any knowledge about, why won’t the system automatically 
be completely unbreakable? Why restrict the choice off to be from the set of 
functions F? It turns out that it is important to both the security and the usability of 
the system to specify F. Suppose we simply request A and B to collaborate on 
choosing a function. This requires time and imagination, and unless they are skilled, 
their choice is likely to be poor. For instance, if they decided that the first letters of 
each paragraph of the message should spell out “GIPWOLLEY,” then most small 
changes by the forger to the message would leave these characters the same and thus 
would be undetected. So the secret function must be dependent on most of the 
characters in the message. If the communicants plan to calculate such a function by 
hand, they will most likely make a mistake. So either they must know how to 
program a computer, or there must be a software package designed to help them 
create functions. Such a package, if it is at all usable, will limit the choice of 
functions, and immediately we have to worry that the choice is sufficiently large to 
ensure security-which of course is the subject of this section. But let’s suppose that 
the communicants are able to program. We suspect that a sizable percentage of 
programmers, when faced with the problem of creating a secret function which is 
dependent on all the bits of a message, would choose a function of the form, “Accept 
only messages which are congruent to 289 modulo 83 1,” or perhaps “Compress the 
message by exclusive-OR-ing it together in 32-bit chunks, and accept only messages 
whose result is hex ‘7A28E910’.” For both of these methods, it is easy to distort a 
message to another message which has the same authentication tag, even without 
knowing the specific integers involved. If the least common multiple of,all numbers 
less than 1000 is added to a message, then its residue modulo anything less than 1000 
(as well as modulo many other numbers) will be unchanged. Incidentally, this LCM 
is fewer than 1000/n(2) bits long. To foil the exclusive-OR techniques is even easier: 
if S is any bit string such that the result of compressing S using 32-bit exclusive-OR’s 
is hex “00000000,” then S 0 M will compress to the same value that M compresses 
to. The point of this discussion is to illustrate why it is important to have a 
mathematical foundation behind the authentication scheme. 
An authentication tag differs from a signature in that the receiver B can also create 
the authentication tag and thus a proper message. B cannot prove to a third party 
that the message originated with A since the third party will realize that B could have 
fabricated it. It may appear that this disadvantage is not shared by the digital 
signature technique. This is only partly true. If A wants to deny authorship of a 
message which he did indeed send, he can do so (at the cost of a bit of 
embarrassment) by professing that he accidentally revealed his secret signing function 
to B or to someone else. 
On the other hand, if there is a universally trusted agency then authentication tags 
are as good as digital signatures for establishing the authorship of messages. This 
works as follows: Each individual person X shares his secret functionf, only with the 
agency. To send a message to B, A sends his message (tagged using his function) to 
the agency. The message must contain the name of the sender and receiver. The 
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agency first verities that the message it receives has the correct tag for the sender 
named in the message. Then it stores a copy, appends the tag via fB to the message, 
and forwards it on to B. When B verifies that the tag is correct, she accepts the 
message. B can now prove to anyone who trusts the agency that A sent her the 
message by simply asking the agency to check its records. 
A second possible disadvantage of authentication tags is that only a finite number 
of messages can be sent using a particular function. We will prove that any 
unbreakable scheme can only be used a finite number of times, with that number 
dependent on the size of the key and the desired probability of guessing the correct 
tag. We will also show that our scheme approaches the theoretical bound on the 
minimum key size needed to send a given number of messages with a desired level of 
security. 
To compensate for these disadvantage, we can construct an authentication scheme 
which is provably unbreakable. That is to say no resources other than knowledge of 
the key allow forgers to find the correct tag for a forged message. As the length of the 
tag grows the likelihood of a correct tag being appended to a message by forgers who 
don’t know the key becomes more and more remote. 
To make this more precise, we will say that an authentication system is 
unbreakable with certainty p if after a function f is randomly chosen and after forgers 
are given any message m and the corresponding tagf(m), the forgers cannot find a 
different message m’ for which they have better than a probability of p of guessing 
the correct tag. Note that this definition must hold for any m, even one chosen by the 
forgers. 
To create an authentication system which is unbreakable with certainty p, we can 
simply choose T to have at least l/p elements, and let F be a strongly universal, class 
of hash functions from M to T. If we let H’ be the subset of H which maps m to 
f(m), we see that the only information that the forgers have available is that the 
secret function is one of the functions in H’. However, the definition of strongly 
universal, implies that for any m’ distinct from m, the proportion of functions in H’ 
which map m’ to any particular tag t’ is l/] TI. Since / T/ > l/p, any choice the forger 
makes has no more than a probability of p of being correct. 
Gilbert, MacWilliams and Sloane [lo] have found rather complicated strongly 
universal, sets of functions for exactly this purpose. The difficulty with their set and 
with other previously known strongly universal, sets is that the set of functions is so 
large that specifying a function in the class requires a key at least as long as the 
original message. It is desirable to use a key considerably shorter than the message. 
A second problem is that only one message per key can be sent, since knowledge of 
two message-tag pairs may give some information about the value of the function on 
some third message. We will solve these problems separately. 
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3. A SMALL, ALMOST STRONGLY UNIVERSAL, CLASS 
We wish to construct a set of hash functions from some large space A’ to a space 
B’. In the above, A’ is the set of messages and B’ is the set of possible tags. Let a’ 
and b’ be the length of the messages and tags, respectively. Let s = b’ + log, log,(a’). 
Let H be some strongly universal, class of functions which map bit strings of length 
2s to ones of length s. The multiplicative scheme of [6] is fine for this purpose. Each 
member of H’ will be constructed from a sequence of length log, a’ - log, b’ of 
members of H. Supposef, ,fi ,... is some such sequence. We will specify how to apply 
the associated memberf’ of H’ to a message. The message is broken into substrings 
of length 2s. If necessary, the last substring should be padded with blanks. Thus, the 
message will be broken into [a’/2s] substrings.f, is applied to all the substrings and 
the resulting substrings are concatenated. By concatenating the resulting substrings, 
we have obtained a string whose length is roughly half the originals string’s length. 
This process is repeated using& ,f3 ,... until only one substring of length s is left. The 
tag (i.e., the result of the hash function f') is the low-order b’ bits of this substring. 
The key needed to specify f' is the concatenation of the keys needed to specify 
f, ,f* 9... * The multiplicative scheme suggested in [6] has a key roughly twice the size 
of the input. If this class is used for H, the size of the key for H’ will be 4s log,(a’). 
Thus, the key is roughly four times the length of the tags times the log of the length 
of the message. By comparison, the multiplicative scheme by itself would have a key 
whose length was twice that of the message. 
Observe that assuming the functions in H can be evaluated in time proportional to 
s, the functions in H’ also can be evaluated in time proportional to the length of the 
message. 
The sense in which H’ is “almost” strongly universal, is given in the following 
theorem. 
THEOREM. Given any two distinct messages m, and m2 and any two tag values t, 
and t,, the number offunctions which take m, to t, is l/JB’ ( times the total number of 
functions. However, fewer than 2/( B’J of these functions will also take m2 to t,. 
Proof sketch. Each time we halve the length of the messages, there is a small 
(l/(2’)) chance that the two resulting strings are now identical. Since we iterate the 
halving process log, a’ - log, b’ times, the chance that the two strings are identical at 
the next to last step is at most log, a//(27, which is equal to 1/(2b’). Now the fact 
that the function that does the last reduction is chosen from a strongly universal, 
class can be used to show that m, will be taken into any tag with equal probability, 
and as long as the penultimate strings were different, mp will also be taken into any 
string with probability equal to l/(B’ I. Thus, if t, # t,, then less than l/j B’ ) of the 
functions will take m2 to t,, and otherwise, less than 2/j B’ ] will. 
The above theorem can be contrasted with the definition of strongly universal,, 
which says that l/(B’( of the functions must take m, to t,, and that l/IB’] of these 
functions will also take m2 to I,. In terms of the authentication scheme, the theorem 
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states after the enemy knows one message-tag pair, he can do no better than to find 
another message-tag pair which has probability 2/(B’) of being correct. Thus, the 
scheme is unbreakable with certainty 2/\B’I, and this certainty can be made smaller 
than any predetermined value. 
4. AUTHENTICATING MULTIPLE MESSAGES 
The above method does not allow us to tag more than one message using the same 
function, since once the enemy knows two message-tag pairs, he may be able to 
determine more such pairs. One way around this problem might be to use a 
universal, function, which would allow us to send it - 1 messages, but a better 
method is as follows: Let F be a strongly universal, set of functions from M to B, 
where B is the set of bit strings of length k. Each message in A4 must contain a 
message number between 1 and n. The secret key shared by the sender and receiver 
now consists of two parts. The first part specifies a function f in F. The second part 
of the key is a sequence (b,,..., b,) of elements of B. The sender must be certain never 
to send two messages with the same message number. To create the authentication 
tag ti for the message m, (a message with message number i) the sender first 
calculates f(mi) and then exclusive-or’s this result with bi. Since each message 
contains a message number, the receiver can duplicate this process to verify the tag is 
correct. (If a message is unnumbered, it is automatically rejected as a forgery.) We 
wish to show that this scheme is unbreakable with certainty 1/(2k). 
THEOREM. Suppose some key (f, (b, ,..., 6,)) has been chosen randomly from the 
set of keys. Let m, ,..., m, be any n messages, with the restriction that the message 
numbers must all be dtrerent (we assume that m, has number i.) Suppose a forger 
knows only the set F and the set of messages and their corresponding tags ti = 
f (m,) 0 bi. (We use @ to denote the exclusive-or operation.) Then there is no new 
message (with any message number) for which the forger has a better than 1/(2k) 
chance of correctly guessing the tag. 
Proof Suppose the forger wishes to guess the tag to the new message m. Without 
loss of generality, we assume m has the message number 1. For each t in B, define 
S, = ( ( g, b) ) g E F, b E B, g(m ,) @ b = t, and g(m) @ b = t }. In other words, S, is 
the set of partial keys (partial since only the first of n elements of b are specified) 
which are consistent with the fact that m, has tag t,, and which give the bogus 
message m the tag t. It isn’t hard to show that since F is strongly universal,, each of 
the S,‘s have the same size. Further, there is exactly one way to extend each partial 
key in S, to a complete key which also assigns tag ti to message m, for i = 2,..., n 
(namely, let bi = g(m,) 0 ti.) Thus, of all the keys which are consistent with the infor- 
mation which the forger has available, as many will assign to m any one tag as any 
other tag. Thus, the forger’s probability of guessing the correct tag for m is 1/(2k). 
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A similar theorem holds when you use an almost strongly universal, class. 
The next theorem shows that the number of bits required by this scheme is 
asymptotically optimal. To make this precise, we define OPT(n) to be the smallest 
key size needed to prevent a forger from having more than a specified probability of 
success at forging at least one out of n messages. We prove that as n approaches 
infinity, the number of bits our scheme uses to send n messages with the same 
security, divided by OPT(n), approaches 1. A similar theorem has also been proved 
by Fak [8]. We will consider a slightly more general scenario in which the messages 
need not have message numbers. Suppose a function has been selected from a set F. 
The forger chooses a message m, and tries to guess the correct tag. He is then told 
the correct tag t, . Now the forger selects a second message m2, trys to guess the tag, 
and then is told the correct tag t,. This process is repeated n times. If we wish, we 
may require the forger to choose each message from a restricted subset of the set of 
all messages, or we may even have a fixed sequence of messages-these variations 
don’t affect the following theorem. 
THEOhEM. In the above scenario, if the forger’s probability of success on his ith 
guess is <pi, then F must contain at least l/(p,p, . ..p.,) functions. 
Proof Let FO = F and Fk = {fe F ]f(m,) = t, for i = l,..., k}. The forger might 
use the following strategy in his guessing: After choosing the ith message, he 
enumerates the set Fi-, , randomly chooses a member of it, and guesses the tagf(m,). 
Since this has <pr chance of success, it must be the case that ]{fE Fi-, s.t. 
f(mi) = ti}l <pi JFi_l]. The set on the left-hand side is F,, so we have IF,-, I> 
(l/pi) (F,I. This is true for each i, so we have IF01 > (l/p,) . . . (l/p,,) /F,I. The 
theorem follows since FO = F and (F, 1 > 1. 
COROLLARY. Whenp,=p,=... =p, then it requires at least n(-log,(p)) bits to 
specify a randomly chosen member of F for any scheme which is unbreakable with 
certainty p and be able.to send n messages. Note that the scheme we presented above 
requires n(-log,(p)) + K bits, where K is the number of bits needed to specifv an 
element of a strongly universal, class of hash functions. 
5. TESTING SET EQUALITY 
In this section we present a linear time algorithm for probabilistically testing many 
sets for equality. More formally, suppose we have a sequence of requests which may 
name an arbitrary number of sets and an arbitrary number of elements. Each request 
can be one of the following four commands: 
ADD(x, S)-Adds the element x to the set named S. This operation may not be 
used if x is already a member of S. If S has not previously been used in any 
commands, it is treated as a name for the empty set. 
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DELETE(x, S)--Removes element x from the set named S. This may only be 
used if x is a member of S.’ 
TEST(S,, S,)-Returns “true” if the sets named by S, and S, are equal, and 
“false” otherwise. TEST may possibly call two sets equal when they are not, but it 
cannot call them unequal when they are actually equal. 
FIND(S)--Returns a list of the names of sets which are equal to S. S will 
always be included in this list. This list may, by mistake, contain the names of sets 
which are actually not equal to S, but no equal set can be overlooked. 
Given any E > 0, we can process a sequence of requests in expected time linear in 
the number of requests times (-log(c)). The error probability for each TEST request 
will be less than E, and for each FIND request, less than E times the number of set 
names in existence at the time of the request. In addition to the four requests 
mentioned above, one may also have either COPY and DIFF requests, or 
ELEMENT, LIST and CONTAINERS requests. These are defined as follows: 
COPY(S,, S&--S, becomes another name for the set named by S,. 
DIFF(S,, S&-Assigns S, to be the symmetric difference of S, and S,. 
ELEMENT(x, S)---Returns “true” if x is a member of the set named S and 
“false” otherwise. This response is always correct. 
LIST(S)--Returns a list of the elements of the set named S. 
CONTAINERS(x+Returns a list of the names of all the currently-existing sets 
which contain x. 
The algorithm which performs these operations is a modification of a known 
heuristic (see [ 13 J) which, when two sets are unequal, will sometimes rapidly 
determine that they are unequal. (The rest of the time, the heuristic is unable to 
decide if they are equal or not.) We modify the scheme so that given any sequence of 
requests which create unequal sets, there is a high probability that the algorithm will 
determine they are unequal. The probability may be made so high that the lack of 
showing they are unequal is sufficient evidence for the particular application to treat 
them as equal. For instance, one can make the probability less than the probability 
that the computer would make a hardware error during the additional time which 
would be required to perform a complete test. 
We view this algorithm as a tool to be used for other applications, rather than 
because we are directly interested in testing set equality. Thus, it is important that we 
can prove that the probability of making a mistake is not dependent on the particular 
characteristics of the input string, otherwise our application could only use sequences 
of requests which had those characteristics. We accomplish this by constructing a 
class of algorithms and showing that for the worst input, there is only a low 
probability that a randomly chosen algorithm will produce an error. 
The basic idea behind the set equality tester is that with each set name Si, there is 
an “abbreviation” Vi. When a change is made to a set, the abbreviation is updated. 
and two sets are claimed to be equal if their abbreviations are equal. Associated with 
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each abbreviation, there must be a list of the set names which currently have that 
abbreviation. Of course, we store the abbreviations (and their corresponding lists) in 
a hash table. Incidentally, since the VI’s are produced by hashing, it is sufficient 
simply to mask off bits as the hash function used to store them in this table. 
To be more specific, let G be a group with operation 0 and denote the inverse of x 
in G by x-‘. Let h be a hash function chosen from a strongly universal, set which 
maps elements of the sets being constructed into G. One might implement this scheme 
with G being the set of bit strings of a certain length, and 0 being exclusive-or. This 
operation is easy to perform, and the inverse operation-the identity function-is 
even easier. 
The first time a set name Si is used, its corresponding Vi is set to the identity 
element of G. The requests are handled as follows: 
ADD(x, S,) is implemented by updating Vi to Vi @ h(x), and removing Si from 
the list associated with the old value of Vi and adding it to the new. (In order to be 
able to perform the removal in constant time, we must keep a pointer with the name 
S,. which points to where this name is in the list associated with Vi.) 
DELETE(x, Si) is implemented similarly, except h(x)-’ is used in place of h(x). 
TEST(S,, Sj) is implemented by comparing Vi with Vi. 
FIND(S,) simply returns the list associated with Vi. 
COPY(S,, Sj) removes Si from VI)s list, sets Vi = Vj, and adds Si to Vi’s list. 
DIFF(S,, Sj) sets Vi to Vi @ Vj, and updates the lists associated with the old 
and new abbreviations appropriately. We observe that for DIFF to work correctly, 
x-’ must be x for all x E G, which is the case when the group operation is exclusive- 
or. 
ELEMENT, LIST and CONTAINERS-to be able to perform these operations, 
one must maintain several additional hash tables. One contains all pairs (x, Si) which 
have been the subject of an ADD request but not a DELETE request. This table is 
used to answer ELEMENT requests. A second hash table associates with each x a 
list of the sets which contain x. This table is consulted to perform a CONTAINERS 
request. In order to be able to update this list in constant time when a 
DELETE(x, Si) request is encountered, it is necessary to associate with the pair 
(x, Si) in the first hash table a pointer to Si in the list associated with x. Finally, to 
be able to answer LIST(S,) requests, we need to associate to the name Si a list of 
elements which are currently in Si. Again, we need to have a pointer stored with the 
pair (x, S,) which will enable us to remove x from the list associated with Si in 
constant time when a DELETE(x, S,) request is encountered. 
These techniques may be modified to deal with multi-sets instead of sets. A multi- 
set is similar to a set, except one counts how many times an element has been 
inserted into the multi-set. Two multi-sets are equal only if each element has been 
inserted the same number of times. In the above discussion we suggested using 
exclusive-or as the operation 0. If one uses ordinary addition instead, then a scheme 
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similar to the one described above can process the requests, ADD(x, k, S), which 
adds k copies of x to S (we no longer need the restriction that x was not already in 
S), DELETE(x, k, S), TEST@,, Sj) and FIND@,). Analogously to the set equality 
case, one can additionally add either the COPY and MULTISET-UNION 
commands, or the ELEMENT, LIST and CONTAINERS commands. Here, 
ELEMENT(x, Si) returns how many times x occurs in Si. A difficulty with using 
addition instead of exclusive-or is that the Vi’s can get arbitrarily large, and thus the 
assumption that the operations take constant time may no longer be valid. However. 
if the sequence of requests never makes very large multi-sets, then this will not be a 
problem. 
We now mention three applications of set equality testers. The generation of LR or 
LALR parse tables can be speeded up since a considerable amount of time is spent 
checking if a set of items is new or has already been generated. Here, the FIND 
command is particularly useful. Secondly, a graph may be represented as a set of 
nodes and a set of edges. Testing labeled graphs for equality is now easy. Finally, the 
memory state of a computer may be represented as a set of pairs, each pair consisting 
of an address and the value stored in that address [3]. If a value in memory is 
changed, we delete the pair consisting of the address and the old value, and add the 
pair of the address and the new value. We can use our method to see if a memory 
state has been seen before, and thus whether the program is looping (see [4]). 
It is conceivable that the equality test could be extended to other requests. If the 
equality test could be extended adequately, a good part of a language like SETL 
might fit in such a scheme. However, a recent result [ 141 suggests that it is 
impossible to find a fast test for two sets being disjoint. 
6. IMPLEMENTING STRONGLY UNIVERSAL, SETS 
We can create a strongly universal, set of functions as follows: Each function will 
map the set of names of set elements (that is, the XI’S of the set equality tester) to the 
group G. The techniques of [6] give us the ability to use an associative memory 
which requires constant expected time per request. We assume the ability to generate 
random numbers. We will use these two abilities to create a partial functionfdefined 
only on all the inputs we have seen.f(x) is computed as follows: if there is a value 
associated with x in the associative memory, thenf(x) is that value. Otherwise,f(x) 
equals a value chosen randomly from G, and x and that value are stored in the 
associative memory. Thus, the value of hash on any element is independent of its 
values on any other elements. 
We can now prove: 
THEOREM. The probability that the set equality tester described above incorrectly 
answers a TEST request is no more than the reciprocal of the number of elements in 
the group. 
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ProojI There are two imaginable errors: our algorithm might say two equal sets 
were unequal, or it might say two unequal sets were equal. If Vi # V, then sets Sj and 
Si must be unequal. Thus, the first type of error cannot occur. We will now find the 
probability of saying two unequal sets are equal. 
If sets Sj and Si are unequal then either set Sj or set Si must have an element not 
contained in the other. We enumerate the elements of set S, by Xi,k. Without loss of 
generality we will assume Si has an element, xi,, not contained in Sj. If Vi = Vi then 
h(xi,*) 0 h(xi,,) “* =h(xj,*) 0 h(xj,2) ‘*’ 
which is true if and only if 
h(Xi,*)=h(Xi.,)-‘Oh(Xi,3)-’ “‘oh(Xj,*)Oh(Xj,*)“‘. 
It follows from the definition of strongly universal, that for any b E G (where G is 
the range of the hash function) the probability that h(x,,,) = b is independent of the 
value of b and the values of h on other elements, so the probability that h(Xi,l) = 
h(Xi,Z)-’ 0 h(Xi,j)-l “’ @ h(Xj,*) @ h(Xj,*) “’ is the reciprocal of the number of 
elements in G. Thus, the probability that Vi = Vj when Si # Sj is the reciprocal of the 
number of elements in G. 
Notice that one indeed needs to use a strongly universal, set of functions, since the 
above reasoning requires that the value of h(S,) be independent of the value of h on 
all the other elements of sets S, and Sj. 
If the group elements are all bit string of length 100, the error probability per test 
would be l/2”‘. This might well be less than the probability of a machine error in 
the extra time necessary to do a complete check. 
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